Establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East

Study Guide

Problem Diagnosis

One important tool when attempting to foster international peace has been the creation of so-called “nuclear-weapon-free zones”, defined by the United Nations as “regional approaches” with the aim of “establishing disarmament norms and consolidating international efforts towards peace and security”. The general idea is that by entering into such agreements, member states try to specifically ensure that other nations refrain from using nuclear weapons when trying to counterbalance any perceived foreign threats.

Calls for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East (more specifically, the MENA region) date to as far as the 1970s, but little progress has been made on that front so far. This is, maybe rather unsurprisingly, down to the fact that when trying to set up a NWFZ in that area, several problems quickly present themselves.

One of the first great difficulties is that there are countries who cannot unequivocally be assigned to either the African or Asian continent, which has already led to disagreement concerning the area that a NWFZ would cover and which countries or territories it would include. This is not made any easier by the strained relationship between several key actors in the region, most notably perhaps Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran, something that has further complicated efforts to create a zone that would, at least in order to have any tangible effect, have to include these states in some way, shape or form. The interest to establish any such zone also greatly varies between countries, with certain Arab states and Israel, for example, showing very little interest at times. Differing perceptions relating to threat and security (again most relevantly concerning Israel and various Arab states) has further complicated negotiations. Lastly, past or in a lot of cases still ongoing conflicts in the region have further worsened the prospects of any such zone ever being created.

However, all this should not greatly detract from the huge potential offered by a NWFZ in the Middle East. It may even embolden attempts to establish such a zone, ​despite​ the odds. For this reason, the role of the international community has increasingly been to urge on further discussions, while the UN General Assembly more specifically has also been an important forum for talks regarding disarmament efforts, as well as offering assistance at various stages in the complicated process of reaching agreements. The United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which is a subsidiary body that reports directly to the General Assembly First Committee, also has a key role to play in this regard. However, at this stage, UNODA does not have the capacity to report or monitor the progress of even a hypothetical NWFZ in the Middle East. Its powers are very much dependent on the level of commitment that member states in the region are willing to offer.

It’s also worth noting that, thus far, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has assisted efforts to monitor various member states’ adherence to non-proliferation or disarmament treaties by providing on the ground support in the form of local inspections. The IAEA is thus (at least in theory) able to verify any claims made by member states which relate to their nuclear capacity or misuse of nuclear technology. This has, in practice, not come without issues, as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (better known as the “Iran Deal”) may have shown all too well, but some progress can still be said to have been made despite this. More

importantly though, the agency has, amongst other things, declared “full-scope safeguards” on “all nuclear facilities in the MENA region” to be a necessary first step when attempting to create any NWFZ in the Middle East.

Current Situation

While heavily debated from the early 2000s onwards, more recently talks have somewhat hit a wall and overall very little tangible progress has actually been made. That being said, in November of 2019, member states did in fact meet up for what was officially the first “Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction”. Though at face value the event appeared to result in little more than a report and political declaration, it did demonstrate the possibility of changing attitudes, whilst also highlighting the vital role of political will, relevant for all parties involved, if any future progress is to be made.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, little actual progress has been made thus far, but a first important step in any attempt of creating a NWFZ in the Middle East could be to determine which countries such a zone would include, as well as various member states in the region generally working towards reaching further bilateral peace-agreements.

That being said, another question to bear in mind is how some of the important hurdles in the way of a NWFZ could be overcome, including (but not limited to): the region’s great ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, the difficult relationship between some of the region’s member states and of course the ongoing violent conflicts.

Lastly, it’s also worth asking how non-adherence to preexisting international norms or the rules outlined in future agreements should be dealt with.

Written by Andrew Oakeshott